TAKAUCHI,Kazuhiro - Faculty of Commerce Department of Commerce Department of International Business

TAKAUCHI, Kazuhiro

Faculty, Department/Institute

Faculty of Commerce Department of Commerce Department of International Business

Academic status (qualification)

Professor Apr. 1,2022

Graduate Degrees・University

Kobe University Doctor's Degree Program 2010 Completed

Academic Degrees

Mar. 2010 Kobe University
Mar. 2006 Kobe University

Research fields	keyword
International economics
Industrial organization

Research Publications

No.	Type of publication	Date of publication (Date of presentation)	Title	Type of research result	Jointly authored or single authored	Publisher and journal name	Volume number
1	Papers1	2024/2～2024,02,00,,,	Bertrand competition in vertically related markets	Academic Journal	Co-authored	Applied Economics Letters (Taylor＆Francis)	Vol. 31, No. 6, pp.524-529
2	Papers1	2023/12～2023,12,00,,,	Downstream new product development and upstream process innovation	Academic Journal	Co-authored	Journal of Economics (Springer)	Vol. 140 No. 3, pp. 209-231
3	Papers1	2022/5～2022,05,00,,,	Endogenous transport price, R＆D spillovers, and trade	Academic Journal	Co-authored	The World Economy (Wiley)	Vol. 45 No. 5, pp. 1477-1500
4	Papers1	2020/9/23～2020,09,23,,,	Consumer-benefiting transport cost: The role of product innovation in a vertical structure	Other	Co-authored	Discussion Papers	No. 2017 (Revised No.1911)
5	Papers1	2020/3～2020,03,00,,,	Optimal export policy with upstream price competition	Academic Journal	Co-authored	The Manchester School (Wiley)	Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 324-348
6	Papers1	2019/1～2019,01,00,,,	Solving a hold-up problem may harm all firms: Downstream R＆D and transport-price contracts	Academic Journal	Co-authored	International Review of Economics and Finance (Elsevier)	Vol. 59, pp. 29-49
7	Papers1	2018/9～2018,09,00,,,	Rules of origin and uncertain compliance cost	Academic Journal	Co-authored	Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics (Taylor＆Francis)	Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 515-532
8	Papers1	2015/4～2015,04,,,,	Endogenous transport price and international R＆D rivalry	Academic Journal	Single-Author	Economic Modelling (Elsevier)	Vol. 46, pp. 36-43
9	Papers1	2014/9～2014,09,,,,	Port privatization in an international oligopoly	Academic Journal	Co-authored	Transportation Research Part B: Methodological (Elsevier)	Vol. 67, pp. 382-397
10	Papers1	2014/6～2014,06,,,,	Rules of origin and strategic choice of compliance	Academic Journal	Single-Author	Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (Springer)	Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 287-302
11	Papers1	2013/6～2013,06,,,,	Endogenous rules of origin, external tariff reduction and market structure	In-house publication	Co-authored	Keizai-Johou-Ronsyu	Vol. 13, Issue No. 1, pp. 65-78
12	Papers1	2011/8～2011,08,,,,	Rules of origin and international R＆D rivalry	Academic Journal	Single-Author	Economics Bulletin (Accessecon)	Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 2319-2332
13	Papers1	2011/3～2011,03,,,,	R＆D efficiency and collaboration networks	In-house publication	Co-authored	Kobe University Economic Review	Vol. 56 (2010), pp. 33-56
14	Papers1	2010/4～2010,04,,,,	The effects of strategic subsidies under FTA with ROO	Academic Journal	Single-Author	Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics (Taylor＆Francis)	Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 57-72
15	Theses26	2010/3～2010,03,00,,,	International trade and rules of origin under oligopolistic competition		Single-Author	Doctoral Dissertation

PapersBertrand competition in vertically related marketsIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredTomomichi MIZUNO;Kazuhiro TAKAUCHIApplied Economics Letters (Taylor＆Francis)Vol. 31, No. 6, pp.524-5292024/2～10.1080/13504851.2022.2140101We build a successive Bertrand model with a homogenous good. We show that increasing the production efficiency of an industry can reduce firms' profits. We also show that this result holds in the successive Cournot model. Hence, an industrial policy aimed at improving production efficiency may be undesirable for firms.

PapersDownstream new product development and upstream process innovationIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredKAWASAKI, Akio;MIZUNO, Tomomichi;TAKAUCHI, KazuhiroNew product introduction;Cost-reducing R&D;Upstream firmJournal of Economics (Springer)Vol. 140 No. 3, pp. 209-2312023/12～10.1007/s00712-023-00841-yResearch and development (R&D) in upstream and downstream markets influence each other. This is because, in assembly industries, when upstream input prices are low, downstream firms can easily introduce or develop new products. The introduction of a new product creates a new final good market, creating an increased demand for inputs. This greater demand for inputs provides an incentive for upstream firms to reduce their costs through R&D. In this study, we consider both downstream R&D for new product introduction and upstream R&D for cost reduction. We show that if upstream R&D is efficient (inefficient), the results of the downstream new product introduction race are strategic complements (substitutes). Furthermore, in terms of timing, the upstream firm determines its input price after observing the downstream firm’s investment decision, with the upstream firm extracting benefits from downstream R&D by raising the input price. It is well-known that this behavior by upstream firms impedes downstream investment (the hold-up problem). Despite this timing structure, we show that the more downstream firms invest, the lower the input price.

PapersUnrefereedIn-house publicationCo-authored;;2023/12～

PapersEndogenous transport price, R＆D spillovers, and tradeIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredTAKAUCHI, Kazuhiro;MIZUNO, TomomichiThe World Economy (Wiley)Vol. 45 No. 5, pp. 1477-15002022/5～10.1111/twec.13189Efficient distribution has a considerable influence on the sales volume of firms, and thus affects the firms' research and development (R&D) activities. This paper analyzes the relationship between competition in the transport sector and R&D of firms using the transportation services. We consider a two-region reciprocal market in which firms invest in cost-reducing R&D and use carriers that engage in price competition to supply their products to the foreign market. We show that, corresponding to the degree of R&D spillover, a transport cost (or price) reduction due to an increase in the number of carriers can increase or decrease the firms' R&D investments. This result is consistent with the finding in previous studies that trade liberalization can hinder R&D. Because inefficient firms lead to high prices in the market, an increase in the number of carriers may reduce consumer surplus. We further discuss a case in which firms have monopsony power in transportation services and show that our main results are robust to the extension.

PapersConsumer-benefiting transport cost: The role of product innovation in a vertical structureUnrefereedOtherCo-authoredKazuhiro Takauchi;Tomomichi MizunoTransport cost; Consumer surplus; Product R＆DDiscussion PapersNo. 2017 (Revised No.1911)2020/9/23～Graduate School of Economics, Kobe UniversityWe study the effects of a reduction of transport cost on the firm's activity of product innovation and on consumer welfare. Firms engage in product R&D that increases the degree of product differentiation, purchase intermediate inputs from an exclusive supplier, and export their products to the foreign market paying a per-unit transport cost. Trade theory commonly asserts that zero transport cost maximizes consumer surplus. Contrary to this standard belief, we show that a positive transport cost can maximize consumer surplus. We also consider more general effects of R&D and show that our main results hold even in such case.

PapersOptimal export policy with upstream price competitionIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredTomomichi Mizuno;Kazuhiro TakauchiThe Manchester School (Wiley)Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 324-3482020/3～10.1111/manc.12278We present a third-market model with a vertical trading structure, in which upstream input suppliers engage in homogeneous price competition. We show that, under downstream Bertrand competition, a non-monotonic export policy may result. Specifically, the optimal policy of the exporting country can turn into a tax--subsidy--tax as the degree of product substitutability rises. We also confirm the conventional result for which the optimal policy is an export subsidy (tax) if there is Cournot (Bertrand) competition downstream, provided that the number of domestic suppliers is at an intermediate level. We further discuss bilateral policy interventions when both exporting countries offer a subsidy/tax to their domestic downstream firms. We show that a non-monotonic export policy (tax--subsidy--tax) can arise even in this extended setting.SSCI

PapersSolving a hold-up problem may harm all firms: Downstream R＆D and transport-price contractsIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredKazuhiro Takauchi;Tomomichi MizunoInternational Review of Economics and Finance (Elsevier)Vol. 59, pp. 29-492019/1～10.1016/j.iref.2018.08.002This study considers transport-price contracts in a two-country duopoly model with firm-specific carriers. It is well-known that when an upstream firm fails to commit to keeping its transaction (or transport) price after a downstream firm's R&D investment, it causes the hold-up problem and diminishes the incentive for R&D investment. While previous literature emphasizes that the commitment to keep the transaction price is needed to overcome the hold-up problem, we show that this commitment may harm all firms. We also discuss the robustness of our results in cases with R&D spillovers, product differentiation, and non-linear production costs.SSCI

PapersRules of origin and uncertain compliance costIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredTomomichi Mizuno;Kazuhiro TakauchiAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics (Taylor＆Francis)Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 515-5322018/9～10.1080/16081625.2017.1346478This study considers the role of the cost uncertainty associated with meeting the rules of origin (ROO) in a free trade area/agreement (FTA). While the literature tends to overlook the cost uncertainties of ROO compliers, we show that the uncertain production costs resulting from meeting the ROO yield the coexistence of compliers and non-compliers in symmetric oligopoly firms. We also show that the regime in which compliers and non-compliers coexist is not the best one for an FTA importer, while it may be the best one for world welfare. We also discuss the case that uncertain production costs are firm-specific.SSCI

PapersEndogenous transport price and international R＆D rivalryIn refereedAcademic JournalSingle-AuthorKazuhiro Takauchi;Economic Modelling (Elsevier)Vol. 46, pp. 36-432015/4～10.1016/j.econmod.2014.12.019The purpose of this paper is to consider the relationship between monopoly transport prices and an industry's technology level of research and development (R&D). Although R&D efficiency is often considered a key factor to improve the performance of firms in an industry, we demonstrate that this standard view does not always hold in a trade model involving a monopoly transporter. In a one-way duopoly case, an exporter competes with a local firm in the local market but must pay a transport charge to the monopoly transporter to carry its product. We show that higher R&D efficiency may reduce the investments of an exporter. We further investigate a case of two-way trade comprising two symmetric countries. We also show that higher R&D efficiency may reduce the producers' profit.SSCI

PapersPort privatization in an international oligopolyIn refereedAcademic JournalCo-authoredNoriaki Matsushima;Kazuhiro Takauchi;Transportation Research Part B: Methodological (Elsevier)Vol. 67, pp. 382-3972014/9～10.1016/j.trb.2014.04.010We investigate the effects of port privatization on port usage fees, firm profits, and welfare. Our model consists of an international duopoly with two ports and two markets. When the unit transport cost is high, port privatization reduces port usage fees, although neither government has an incentive to privatize its port. The equilibrium governmental decisions are inconsistent with the desirable outcome if the unit transport cost is not high enough. The government of the smaller country, in terms of market size, is more likely to privatize its port, and the government of the larger country is more likely to nationalize its port to protect its domestic market.SSCI

PapersRules of origin and strategic choice of complianceIn refereedAcademic JournalSingle-AuthorKazuhiro Takauchi;Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (Springer)Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 287-3022014/6～10.1007/s10842-013-0159-8This paper examines how an input supplier's monopoly power affects exporters' choice between compliance and noncompliance with rules of origin (ROO) in a free trade area (FTA). When the regional input supplier has monopoly power, the number of compliers largely affects the input price. This is because to meet ROO, exporters must use a certain ratio of the input originated within the area. In such a case, each exporter has an incentive to choose noncompliance with ROO if the rival exporter complies. Because this incentive yields strategic substitution between symmetric exporters, the coexistence of the complier and the non-complier appears in equilibrium. Our model consists of three final-good producers (one in an importing country and two in an exporting country) and one input supplier, which is in the importing country and has monopoly power. We show that within the range of parameter values for which some exporters comply with ROO, the content rate affects the output of the final-good producer in the importing country and the country's welfare in a U-shaped fashion. The content rate levels that allow the coexistence of the complier and the non-complier minimize welfare.Emerging Sources Citation Index

International academic conference;2013/7/27～

PapersEndogenous rules of origin, external tariff reduction and market structureUnrefereedIn-house publicationCo-authoredKazuhiro Takauchi;Tomomichi Mizuno;Keizai-Johou-RonsyuVol. 13, Issue No. 1, pp. 65-782013/6～Faculty of Economics, Management & Info. Sci., Onomichi City UniversityThis paper considers the effects of the external tariff reduction on an endogenous rules of origin (ROO), firm behavior, and welfare in an oligopolistic two-way trade model of free trade area (FTA). We show that, in the presence of endogenously determined ROO, an external tariff reduction improves the domestic welfare of the FTA member countries if the market size of those countries is small enough. We also examine the relationship between market structure and the effects of external tariff reduction.

PapersRules of origin and international R＆D rivalryIn refereedAcademic JournalSingle-AuthorKazuhiro Takauchi;Economics Bulletin (Accessecon)Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 2319-23322011/8～We study a three-country three-firm free trade area (FTA) trade model with rules of origin (ROO) under international R&D competition. The external tariff is chosen by the country importing final goods in the FTA. If the FTA chooses a higher content rate of ROO, the country importing final goods chooses a higher tariff in order to compensate for lower consumer surplus. We have three results. First, if the FTA raises the content rate, it raises the costs of exporters within the area, but if the R&D cost is sufficiently low, the exporters actually increase exports and their profits also increase. Second, if the firms within the FTA are less efficient than outsiders, the social welfare of countries importing final goods is affected by the content rate in a U-shaped fashion. A tightening of ROO may reduce the social welfare of importing countries since it may replace productive firms outside the FTA with less productive local firms. Third, if the productivity within an FTA is relatively high, the optimal content rate of ROO for the importing country within the FTA is 100%. In that case, the country importing final goods does not need to rely on imports from outside. Since an increase in the content rate of ROO increases external tariff, the most stringent ROO requirement is desirable for that country.Emerging Sources Citation Index

PapersR＆D efficiency and collaboration networksUnrefereedIn-house publicationCo-authored;;Kobe University Economic ReviewVol. 56 (2010), pp. 33-562011/3～Graduate School of Economics, Kobe UniversityWe investigate the relationships between collaboration networks and the efficiencies of R&D and collaboration. In our model, there are three firms, and firms’ collaboration patterns are represented by networks. Since the number of firms is three, there are four possible shapes for collaboration networks (1) the complete network, (2) a star network, (3) an exclusive network, and (4) the empty network. Firms engage in Cournot competition, and we obtain four results on competition in the four respective networks. We show which network shapes are stable and optimal with respect to the efficiencies of R&D and collaboration.

PapersThe effects of strategic subsidies under FTA with ROOIn refereedAcademic JournalSingle-AuthorKazuhiro Takauchi;Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics (Taylor＆Francis)Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 57-722010/4～10.1080/16081625.2010.9720852This paper presents a model of a free trade area (FTA) with rules of origin (ROO) under an oligopolistic final goods market. Following the existing literature, we also consider ROO to serve as a protectionist device and mainly focus on the interaction between ROO and the subsidy policy. A paradoxical result is considered: if the government of the final goods exporter within the FTA is the first mover, it chooses export tax. Furthermore, we show that the profit of a firm located in the FTA increases due to a reduction in the external tariff.SSCI

ThesesInternational trade and rules of origin under oligopolistic competitionSingle-AuthorKazuhiro TakauchiDoctoral Dissertation2010/3～Kobe University