太田 勝憲オオタ カツノリ |
|---|
所属学部・学科等
- 総合情報学部 総合情報学科
職名 (資格)
- 教授 2021年 4月 1日
出身学校・専攻
- 慶應義塾大学 経済学部2000年
出身大学院・研究科
- 神戸大学修士課程 経済学研究科2002年
- 神戸大学博士課程 経済学研究科2005年
取得学位
- 博士（経済学） 2005年 3月
ホームページ・メール
専門分野
| 専門分野 | キーワード |
|---|---|
| ゲーム理論 | 繰り返しゲーム |
研究職歴
- 神戸大学大学院経済学研究科 2005年4月 ～2006年3月
- 京都大学経済研究所 COE研究員 2006年4月 ～2007年3月
- 和歌山大学経済学部講師 2007年4月 ～2008年3月
- 和歌山大学経済学部准教授 2008年4月 ～2021年3月
所属学会
| 所属学会・団体名 | 役職名 (役職在任期間) |
|---|---|
| 日本経済学会 | |
| Econometric Society |
1
研究業績
| No. | 研究業績の種類 | 発表年月日 | 標題 | 出版物の種類 | 共著・単著の別 | 出版社・掲載誌 | 巻・号・頁 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 論文1 | 2023年2023,00,00,,, | Burden-sharing and Self-enforcing Climate Agreements | 学術雑誌 | 国内共著 | Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists | forthcoming |
| 2 | 論文1 | 2016年11月 2016,11,00,,, | Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships | 学術雑誌 | 国内共著 | Journal of Economic Theory | vol.166, pp.311-323. |
| 3 | 論文1 | 2012年11月 2012,11,00,,, | Optimal Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in Multimarket Contact | 学術雑誌 | 国内共著 | Games and Economic Behavior | vol. 76(2), pp.636-647. |
| 4 | 論文1 | 2008年10月 2008,10,00,,, | Multimarket Contact in Continuous-time Games | 学術雑誌 | 国内共著 | Economics Letters | vol. 101, pp.4-5. |
| 5 | 論文1 | 2008年1月 2008,01,00,,, | Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: A Survey | 大学・研究所等紀要 | 単著 | 和歌山大学経済学会 経済理論 | 341巻 43-64ページ |
| 6 | 学位論文26 | 2005年3月 2005,03,00,,, | Applications of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring | その他 | 単著 | 博士号学位取得論文 神戸大学大学院経済学研究科 |
論文Burden-sharing and Self-enforcing Climate Agreements査読有学術雑誌国内共著太田勝憲;大堀秀一Climate agreements;Emission quotas;Equity;Technology investments;Repeated gamesJournal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economistsforthcoming2023年This study analyzes self-enforcing climate agreements in a repeated-game framework in which asymmetric countries emit greenhouse gases over time. In particular, we consider a novel burden-sharing scheme that makes an agreement self-enforcing even when a relatively less patient country participates in the agreement. The long-term
stable emission quota that makes the agreement self-enforcing for the largest set of
discount factors equalizes the compliance thresholds across countries. We then show
that the long-term stable quota satisfies grandfathering as an equity criterion when countries are asymmetric. This implies that low-emitting countries that have devel-
oped clean technologies will be reluctant to agree to the scheme, while countries that have invested in adaptation and brown technology are likely to accept the emission quota. Furthermore, an ambitious target level deteriorates the compliance incentives of countries that are allowed to have low emission reduction rates.
論文Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships査読有学術雑誌国内共著太田勝憲;小林創Partnerships;Repeated games;Imperfect public monitoring;Sharing rules;Optimal equilibriumJournal of Economic Theoryvol.166, pp.311-323.2016年11月 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004This paper extends a model of repeated partnerships by Radner et al. (1986) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose their sharing rule. A sharing rule is optimal if the repeated game under the sharing rule has a public strategy equilibrium whose payoff sum is not improved by any public strategy equilibrium under any sharing rule. Two key factors for the analysis are the efficiency loss from allowing only the more productive partner to work and the efficiency loss in any cooperative equilibrium from imperfect observability. If the latter loss is smaller than the former, a threshold discount factor exists below which an asymmetric sharing rule inducing only one partner to work every period is optimal. At the threshold, an optimal sharing rule uniquely exists that is also optimal for any greater discount factor. The latter sharing rule reduces to the equal sharing rule for identical partners. The optimal equilibrium payoff sum as a function of the discount factor is a step function whose jump occurs at the threshold discount factor.
論文Optimal Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in Multimarket Contact査読有学術雑誌国内共著太田勝憲;小林創Multimarket contact;Infinitely repeated games;Imperfect public monitoringGames and Economic Behaviorvol. 76(2), pp.636-647.2012年11月 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003We investigate optimal collusion in repeated multimarket contact under imperfect public monitoring, where two firms operate in m markets and in each market, each firmʼs decision and public signals are binary. We show that in an optimal pure strategy strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium, the size of efficiency loss is equal to that in the market with the most tempting deviation under single-market contact. Furthermore, we show a sufficient condition under which the symmetric equilibrium is optimal for joint payoff maximization among any perfect public equilibrium.
論文Multimarket Contact in Continuous-time Games査読有学術雑誌国内共著太田勝憲;小林創Multimarket contact;Continuous-time gamesEconomics Lettersvol. 101, pp.4-5.2008年10月 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.031This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.
論文Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: A Survey査読無大学・研究所等紀要単著太田勝憲和歌山大学経済学会 経済理論341巻 43-64ページ2008年1月 10.19002/AN00071425.341.4304516222
学位論文Applications of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoringその他単著太田勝憲博士号学位取得論文 神戸大学大学院経済学研究科2005年3月